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I. INTRODUCTION
In the years since the financial crisis began, holders of loans
initiated nearly 6 million foreclosures in the United States! Some
estimates suggest that another 6.5 million homeowners, already
2
behind on their mortgages face the same prospect . Many experts
agree that reducing the principal owed on such loans is the most
effective way to minimize the number of homeowners who will
ultimately lose their homes,3 and consequently also to reduce the
huge costs associated with foreclosures.4 In spite of this, and of the
incentives to modify that recent legislation has provided, the
holders of these loans are largely unwilling to engage in principal
modifications.6 One way that homeowners could exert pressure on
loan holders to make these modifications is through the possibility
of a cramdown in a Chapter 13 proceeding In these proceedings,
any principal above the current fair market value of home is
treated as unsecured debt, leaving the home encumbered only by
the amount it is currently worth.8 Today, however, the Bankruptcy
Code (The Code) limits courts' ability to modify primary residence
* This Note is part of the North Carolina Banking Institute Symposium on
Foreclosure Crisis.
1. The Private Sector and Government Response to the Mortgage Foreclosure
Crisis, Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Serv., 111th Cong. 3 (2009) (statement
of Julia Gordon, Senior Policy Counsel, Center for Responsible Lending)
www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcs-dem/gordon.pdf.
2. Id.
3. Id. at 9.
4. Kathryn E. Johnson & Carolyn E. Waldrep, Note, The North Carolina
Banking Institute Symposium on the Foreclosure Crisis: Overview, 14 N.C.
Banking Inst. 198-200, (2010).
5. Id. at 203-12.
6. Id. at 201-02.
7. Steven Seidenberg, Battle on the Home Front: A Proposal to Modify
Mortgages in Bankruptcy Fails in Congress, But Proponents Say It's the Missing
Weapon in Fighting Foreclosures, A.B.A. J., Aug. 2009, at 55-56.
8. 11 U.S.C. §1322(b)(2) (2006).
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mortgages, despite the fact that homeowners not in bankruptcy
may attempt to renegotiate and modify their mortgages.9
Although the some of the legislation enacted since the
beginning of the foreclosure crisis provides incentives to loan
holders to renegotiate mortgages,' ° they are insufficient without
permitting a cramdown for primary residence mortgages in
Chapter 13 Bankruptcy proceedings." In order to examine this
issue, this note first discusses the current state of bankruptcy law. 2
Part III then explores current efforts at similar modifications, 3 and
Part IV discusses the benefits that would be created by changing
bankruptcy law to permit cramdowns, particularly the incentives
for servicers to modify mortgages voluntarily.
14
II. CHAPTER 13 BANKRUPTCY AND RECENT PROPOSALS FOR
CHANGE
A. Different Treatment under Chapter 13 for Primary Home
Loans
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code allows individual
debtors who are unable to fully repay their debts to take part in a
system of supervised repayments. 5 Such payments are often
manageable only because bankruptcy judges can reduce the
9. See Manuel Adelino et at., Why Don't Lenders Renegotiate More Home
Mortgages? Redefaults, Self-Cures, and Securitization 2 (Fed. Res. Bank of Boston,
Policy Discussion Paper No. 09-4, 2009), available at www.bos.frb.org/economic/
ppdp/2009/ppdpO9O4.pdf.
10. Johnson & Waldrep, supra note 4, at 203-12.
11. See infra pp. 276-278, notes 15-24.
12. See infra Part II, pp. 276-79, notes 15-35.
13. See infra Part III, pp. 279-85, notes 35-77.
14. See infra Part IV, pp 285-86, notes 78-80.
15. This repayment system distinguishes Chapter 13 Bankruptcy from Chapter 7.
This Note does not address Chapter 7 bankruptcy for several reasons. One is that,
barring some "exempt" property, a debtors assets are liquidated in Chapter 7
bankruptcy and as such it does not serve the purpose, central to the Act, of keeping a
homeowner in his home (section 522(d)(1) allows a debtor to retain a maximum of
$15,000 in real property that serves as the principal residence). 11 U.S.C. 522 (2006).
The second is that states can currently choose to implement their own system of
exemptions that differ from the U.S. Code, and as such the impact of Chapter 7
bankruptcies on the foreclosure crisis would be inconsistent depending on
jurisdiction. U.S. Courts Chapter 7, BANKRUPTCY BASICS, http://www.uscourts.gov/
bankruptcycourts/bankruptcybasics/chapter7.html.
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principal on a debtor's secured debt in cases where the principal
exceeds the actual value, often referred to as a cramdown. 6 The
excess, formerly secured, debt for which creditors had the right to
claim a particular piece of property in case of default, is then
treated as unsecured debt. 7 Modifications like these are especially
relevant in today's financial market, in which so many
homeowners are faced with debt that far exceeds the actual value
of their home. Since the Code's revision in 1978, however, Section
1322(b)(2) permits judges to modify only "secured claims other
than a claim secured only by a security interest in real property
that is the debtor's principal residence."' 8 Because this powerful
cramdown provision does not apply to debts secured by homes,
bankruptcy judges cannot restructure home mortgage principal
and interest payments, and any such modification can only be
achieved with the mortgage holder's agreement. 9 Because efforts
to encourage modifications have focused on renegotiations with
loan holders, they have not been successful without the "stick" of a
judicial cramdown to encourage loan holders and servicers toS• 20
participate.
Bankruptcy relief has not historically been thought of as a
tool for debtors to manage their troubled mortgages. 2' Although
bankruptcy provides a "safety net" for debtors, it precludes
mortgage modification.2 In the wake of the financial meltdown,
16. 11 U.S.C §1322(b)(2)(2006); Principal reductions are frequently referred to as
either "cramdowns" or "strip downs." Adam J. Levitin & Joshua Goodman,
Mortgage Market Sensitivity to Bankruptcy Modification, 4 (3rd Annual Conference
on Empirical Legal Studies Papers) Apr. 2008, available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1121054.
17. 11 U.S.C §1322(b)(2) (2006) (addressing shift from secured to unsecured
debt); Glossary, BANKRUPTCY BASICS, http://www.uscourts.gov/ bankruptcycourts/
bankruptcybasics/glossary.html (on distinction between secured and unsecured debt).
18. 11 U.S.C §1322(b)(2) (2006); Katherine Porter, et al., The Home Ownership
Burdens of Bankrupts, 2009 No. 7 NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER 1, 5 (July 2009); see
also Melissa B. Jacoby, Bankruptcy Reform and the Financial Crisis, 13 N.C. BANK.
INST. 115, 116 (2009) (explaining the reasons for changes to bankruptcy law).
19. See Jacoby, supra note 18, at 116.
20. See Seidenberg, supra note 7, at 55-56.
21. See Jacoby, supra note 18, at 116.
22. H.R. 200, the "Helping Families Save Their Homes in Bankruptcy Act of
2009," and H.R. 225, the "Emergency Homeownership and Equity Protection Act":
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong., Jan. 22, 2009 (Statement
of Associate Professor Adam J. Levitin, Geo. U. L. Center) [hereinafter Hearings],
WL154355.
2010]
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
however, policy makers and legislators have begun considering the
role bankruptcy policy could play in preventing home foreclosures
and lessening the impact on neighborhoods blighted by multiple
foreclosures. 23 This shift in thinking about the role bankruptcy law
should play in stabilizing the economy has resulted in the recent
introduction of several bills aimed at broadening the scope of
bankruptcy judges' power to modify home mortgage loans.24
B. The Push for Cramdown Legislation and Its Subsequent
Failure
The Obama Administration was a vocal supporter of these
attempts to eliminate the Section 1322(b)(2) exemption of home
mortgages from the cramdown provision.2 ' Rhetoric about the
exemption was a feature in the President's stump speeches as he
supported the stimulus plan early in 2009.26 These proposals faced
opposition, however, from parties concerned that the changes
would chill mortgage lending. 27 Opponents such as the Mortgage
Bankers' Association, pointed to how cramdowns of mortgage
23. See Jacoby, supra note 18, at 116.
24. See Jacoby, supra note 18, at 115; see generally Helping Families Save Their
Homes in Bankruptcy Act of 2009, H.R. 200, 111th Cong. § 4 (2009) (permitting
modification of some mortgages secured by primary home residences); Emergency
Homeownership and Equity Protection Act, H.R. 225, 111th Cong. § 3 (2009)
(amending the Code to permit the medication of certain mortgages secured by
primary home residences); Homeowners' Protection Act of 2008, H.R. 7328, 110th
Cong. (2008) (amending the Code to permit the medication of certain mortgages
secured by primary home residences); Helping Families Save Their Homes in
Bankruptcy Act of 2008, S. 2136, 110th Cong. (2008) (permitting bankruptcy judges
to modify the terms of some nontraditional and subprime mortgages secured by
primary home residences); Emergency Home Ownership and Mortgage Equity
Protection Act of 2007, H.R. 3609, 110th Cong. (2007) (permitting the modification
of some mortgages secured by primary home residences).
25. See Edmund L. Andrews, Obama Plan On Housing Said to Push On Lenders,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2009, at B1, available at 2009 WLNR 3066879.
26. Id. ("'It turns out you can't modify that mortgage if you're in bankruptcy,' the
president told residents. 'Now that makes no sense. What that's doing is, it's forcing
a lot of people into foreclosure who potentially would be better off, and the bank
would be better off and the community would be better off, if they're at least making
some payments."').
27. See, e.g., Seidenberg, supra note 7, at 61; John C. Murray & Baxter Dunaway,
Mortgage Modification: Voluntary and Involuntary, 1 L. DISTRESSED REAL EST.
ch.3A, 28, (2008), available at http://www.firstam.com/ncs/resources/doc/05-
Article%201.pdf.
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loan principal might affect loan holders, and by extension, the
availability of credit.2 Allowing bankruptcy judges to change the
principal amount of home loans, they argued, would create such
uncertainty about the value of the loans themselves that loan
holders would be more reluctant to issue new loans.29  To
compensate, the Mortgage Bankers' Association estimates that
interest rates would rise and that lenders would increase the
required down payment and closing costs as insurance against the
possible loss should a bankruptcy judge reduce a borrower's
required mortgage payments.?
Supporters of modifications say that the proposed change
would bring fairness to bankruptcy law, which currently allows
cramdowns on most secured debt outside of primary residence
31 32mortgages." Cramdowns are even permissible for second homes.
Additionally, supporters argue that loan holders should not be
comparing the value of collateral after a bankruptcy proceeding to
the value of collateral that has suffered no losses.33 Rather, the
accurate comparison is post-bankruptcy value to post-foreclosure
value.34 Considered this way, the value investors are likely to
recoup is already uncertain, and it is very likely that they would be
better off with a mortgage modification in bankruptcy rather than
in foreclosure.
III. BENEFITS OF CHANGING BANKRUPTCY LAW TO PERMIT
MORTGAGE CRAMDOWNS
A. Importance of Principal Modifications for Homeowners
The current legislation has not been sufficient to promote
renegotiation for homeowners in need, and as it stands the Code





33. See Adam Levitin, Is Redefault Risk Preventing Mortgage Loan Mods?,
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cannot serve as the necessary "stick" to encourage loan holders to
come to the table with homeowners." To remedy this situation
and create that important incentive, Congress needs to modify the
Code. According to a study comparing housing affordability to
income, homeowners facing foreclosure who are candidates for
Chapter 13 bankruptcy are substantially less likely to be able to
afford their payments than homeowners overall.37 Of homeowners
in Chapter 13 Bankruptcy, seven out of ten live in housing that is
considered "unaffordable" or "severely unaffordable. '3 8  With
such a large proportion of these homeowners trapped in payment
plans that demand huge portions of their income,3 9 the likelihood
of avoiding foreclosure is very low.40 A June 2009 study of a pool
of Wells Fargo mortgage trusts showed that fewer than 60 percent
of homeowners who renegotiated with their loan holders actually
saw a reduction in their payments, and those reductions that did
occur averaged less than $175 each month; larger results are rare
and have generally been the result of litigation.4 ' Homeowners
have very few options available that actually make a substantial
difference in their ability to make payments towards keeping their
homes, and many will still ultimately face foreclosure. 2
Reductions to principal, however, in the rare cases that they
occur,43 bring home costs in line with their current value and make
it feasible for homeowners to make their payments.4
36. Ruth Simon, Rescue Includes Steps to Help Borrowers Keep Homes, WALL
ST. J., Sept, 29, 2008, at A8, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122265697
254684627.html (predicting that forty percent of mortgages will exceed the value of
the homes by the time the market stabilizes).
37. Porter, supra note 18, at 5.
38. Id. at 2 (stating also that HUD Families in bankruptcy were 2.5 times more
likely than the general population to own homes that are "unaffordable" or "severely
unaffordable"); see also DAVID A. VANDENBROUCKE, DEP'T Hous. AND URBAN
DEV., HOUSING AFFORDABILITY DATA SYSTEM 11 (2007), http://www.huduser.org/
Datasets/hads/HADS-doc.pdf (explaining the HUD benchmarks for affordability).
39. Porter, supra note 18, at 1 (explaining that HUD designates borrowers whose
mortgage costs 30-50% of their income as living in unaffordable housing, those
paying greater than 50% as living in severely unaffordable housing.)
40. Id.
41. See Gretchen Morgenson, So Many Foreclosures, So Little Logic, N.Y. TIMES,
July 5, 2009, at BU1, available at 2009 WLNR 12800460; Alan M. White, Rewriting
Contracts, Wholesale: Data on Voluntary Mortgage Modification from 2007 and 2008,
Remittance Reports, 36 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 509, 526 (April, 2009).
42. Id.
43. Id. (stating that 17.2% of loans modified in June of 2009 had reductions in
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B. Changes to the Bankruptcy Code Would Facilitate Principal
Reductions
Changes to Chapter 13 bankruptcy provisions, particularly
to the 1322(b)(2) exemption, could potentitally change the outlook
for borrowers hoping to modify their home loans by significantly
changing the incentive structure for loan holders and servicers."5
While opponents of this kind of change argue that this would harm
lenders by making it harder to rely on the value of homes as
collateral,46 it seems that the losses loan holders often suffer in
foreclosures have the same effect.
1. Cramdown Options in Chapter 13 Would Increase Principal
Reductions
A change to Chapter 13 permitting bankruptcy judges to
apply the cramdown to home mortgages and reduce the principal
owed on home loans in bankruptcy would provide leverage for
borrowers in distress, even for those who do not themselves enter
bankruptcy.47 A 2009 report from Credit Suisse predicts that this
change to the Bankruptcy Code would reduce the number of
foreclosures by twenty percent.48 Under this proposal, mortgages
would be "crammed down" to the current market value of the
property securing the loan, rather than being valued at their
origination amount.49  In the subsequent three to five years of
structured repayment, the value of the reduction would be treated
as a claim with equal priority to other unsecured claims.0 Thus,
loan holders would have a chance to recover some portion of the
principal, interest, or fees).
44. Id.
45. Porter, supra note 18, at 7.
46. See Seidenberg, supra note 7, at 56.
47. Id. at 55-56.
48. ROD DUBITSKY ET. AL., BANKRUPTCY LAW REFORM - A NEW TOOL FOR
FORECLOSURE AVOIDANCE 1 (2009), http://www.bankruptcylawnetwork.com/wp-
contentluploads/2009/O1/credit suisse-bankruptcyjawreform.pdf (noting that this
provision was not included in the version of the stimulus package that passed).
49. Id.
50. Id. (though it is noted that the amount which a borrower would be able to pay
back over a five year period is substantially less than had that same amount been paid
back over the 30 years typical of a mortgage).
2010]
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difference between the original loan and the value of the property
securing it at the time of the borrower's bankruptcy.51
Proponents of this change point out that because so many
homeowners have negative equity in their homes, those who might
have been able to refinance in a better economy or have their
loans otherwise modified, are facing foreclosure proceedings.52
Recognition of the need to reduce balances of these "underwater"
loans is not limited to consumer protection groups. Federal
Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke commented in 2008 that if
servicers would accept principal reductions significant enough to
allow homeowners to modify in the current market it would
"remove the downside risk to investors of additional writedowns
or a re-default.
5 3
2. Renegotiation Would Take Place in the Shadow of Bankruptcy
The knowledge that a borrower could enter Chapter 13
bankruptcy and have their principal reduced through a cramdown
would play an important role in encouraging servicers to
renegotiate outside of bankruptcy.54 Renegotiating would allow
them to make modifications on their own terms, rather than being
subject to terms decided on by a bankruptcy court.5  The president
of the National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys
referred to this incentive as a "sword of Damocles" that
homeowners could "hold over the lenders' heads" and as a
"bargaining chip" that could give homeowners leverage in their
dealings with servicers and loan holders.56 The result is that
distressed homeowners would have increased options in two
51. Id.
52. Seidenberg, supra note 7, at 52; Levitin, supra note 33.
53. CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, SOLUTION TO HOUSING CRISIS
REQUIRES ADJUSTING LOANS TO FAIR MARKET VALUE THROUGH COURT-
SUPERVISED MODIFICATIONS 1 (April 2008) http://www.responsiblelending.org/ mort
gage-lending/policy-Iegislation/congress/court-supervised-modifications-would-make-
large-scale-foreclosure-prevention-possible.pdf.
54. Seidenberg, supra note 7, at 55.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 56. The "sword of Damocles" is a figure from Greek legend, which is
often referenced to illustrate a constant threat. The Sword of Damocles, Ackland Art
Museum, http://www.ackland.org/tours/westall.html.
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directions. First, the servicer would have more incentive to modify
outside of bankruptcy,57 and second, for those homeowners for
whom it was ultimately necessary for the consumer to enter
bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court would have the ability to modify
their home loan in a cramdown. 8 This incentive for servicers to
modify voluntarily would be a very positive effect of changes to
the Bankruptcy Code.
C. Objections to This Provision are not Persuasive
1. Concern about the Chilling of Mortgage Lending
The primary objection to this provision, as well as to
previous attempts to modify the Code, is that allowing cramdowns
would have a chilling effect on mortgage lending. This objection is
less relevant, however, to those provisions that apply only
retroactively.59 By extending the relief of cramdowns to mortgages
that have already been made, this change would prevent many
foreclosures without the risk of preventing future mortgage
lending.6° Even where that is not the case, however, studies
suggest that because losses in foreclosure are greater than those in
bankruptcy, the market will not respond to a change in bankruptcy
law by increasing the cost of credit.6' One study looked at the
effect that cramdowns had on the mortgage market in the 1980's
and 90's, before the case Nobleman v. American Savings Bank62
resolved the circuit split which had permitted cramdowns on
primary residences in some areas.63 The study found that when
57. Seidenberg, supra note 7, at 55-56.
58. Hearings, supra note 22, at 19 (noting that this group is unlikely to be large, as
for most filers bankruptcy is a last choice rather than a strategic option).
59. See DAVID H. CARPENTER, THE PRIMARY RESIDENCE EXCEPTION:
LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS IN THE 111TH CONGRESS TO AMEND THE BANKRUPTCY
CODE TO ALLOW THE STRIP DOWN OF CERTAIN HOME MORTGAGES CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT RL34301 6.( 2009).
60. Id.
61. See Adam J. Levitin, Resolving the Foreclosure Crisis: Modification of
Mortgages in Bankruptcy, 2009 WIs. L. REV. 565, 565.
62. Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 327 (1993).
63. Adam J. Levitin & Joshua Goodman, The Effect of Bankruptcy Strip-Down
on Mortgage Markets, 1 (Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. Bus., Econ. and Regulatory
Policy Working Paper No. 1087816, 2008), available at http://works.bepress.com/
2010]
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cramdowns were permitted, they did not affect either the
origination rates or the number of bankruptcies filed.64 It also
found very small effects in the costs of loans, suggesting that
contrary to the concerns of those who argue cramdowns would
deter lending, the lending market is actually fairly insensitive to
cramdowns. 6' The study suggests that this finding is another result
of the fact that loan holders tend to suffer very limited losses, both
in "scope and magnitude." 66
2. Concern about Spreading Losses to Other Sectors
Another objection is that this change to bankruptcy law
would also have repercussions for holders of other kinds of loans,
such as credit card companies and automobile lenders.67 Under
current law, these loans are repaid in part while homeowners
default on their mortgages, which cannot be modified.68 If the law
is changed, these other loan holders with both secured and
unsecured debt may suffer additional losses as some part of the
pool of money which would otherwise go to them must go to make
payments on the debtors' home loan.69  This would in effect
distribute losses naturally borne by the holders of mortgages as a
result of underwriting standards to other industries which have not
seen the abuses present in the mortgage lending industry, which
some believe would cause rates to rise in those other areas.70 One
argument against this is that both the credit and auto loan
industries have seen changes to the relevant parts of the
Bankruptcy Code in the past without significant impact on their
71rates. Tightening standards in 2005 did not cause a




66. Id. (suggesting that there are not huge increases in bankruptcy filings nor do
lenders lose large amounts in cramdowns compared to foreclosures).
67. Dubitsky, supra note 48, at 2 (noting that this provision was not included in




71. Id. at 13.
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unrealistic to assume that a change in the opposite direction would
cause rates to rise.72 Regardless of the effect on other industries,
however, effective relief for homeowners and stabilization of the
housing market requires legislation which makes clear that
"housing and broader economic policy objectives" must be the
focus of Chapter 13 bankruptcy relief, even at the cost of
borrowers repaying less of their unsecured debt in other areas."
3. Concern about Excessive Chapter 13 Filings to Take Advantage
of Cramdowns
Another concern critics of this proposed change to the
Code have voiced is that it would create "a cottage industry within
consumer bankruptcy" encouraging any homeowners who had
underwater mortgages and qualified for bankruptcy to file in order
to take advantage of reducing their mortgage with a cramdown.74
This concern, however, is not realistic. Chapter 13 Bankruptcy has
significant repercussions for debtors' credit scoresthat last for
years following a bankruptcy filing.75 The primary function of the
cramdown option in Chapter 13 Bankruptcy would not be in its
76
actual use, but in the servicers' awareness of the option. The
knowledge that homeowners could file for Chapter 13, which
would transfer discretion over how the debt was handled from the
servicer to a judge, would work to encourage servicers to engage in
productive renegotiations to prevent that.77
IV. CONCLUSION
Revising the Bankruptcy Code to allow modification of
mortgages secured by primary residences in Chapter 13 would
create convincing incentives for servicers by making them aware of
72. Id. at 13.
73. See Jacoby, supra note 18, at 118.
74. The Worsening Foreclosure Crisis: Is it Time to Reconsider Bankruptcy
Reform?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Oversight & the Courts of
the Comm. on the Judiciary, 11th Cong. 1 (2009) (statement of Richard Genirberg).
75. Dubitsky, supra note 48, at 13.
76. Seidenberg, supra note 7, at 56.
77. See id. at 56.
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the fact that homeowners have the option of a cramdown.8 While
the option would likely be used only rarely, in "isolated and
strategic" instances, 79 especially in better economic times when the
value of homes trends upwards rather than downwards, it would
still work to keep homeowners in their homes and help stabilize
the market by preventing foreclosures and increasing the number
of renegotiations. 80
MARJORIE B. MAYNARD
78. Id. at 55-56.
79. Hearings, supra note 22, at 19.
80. Seidenberg, supra note 7, at 55.
[Vol. 14
